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A PUBLIC CHOICE APPROACH
TO PRIVATE ORDERING:

RENT-SEEKING AT THE WORLD'S
FIRST FUTURES EXCHANGE
Comments on Mark West's
'Private Ordering at the World's First Futures Exchange'
Omri Yadlin*
The literature on private ordering systems has expanded exponen
tially over the last decade. Yet, very few scholars have actually at
tempted to define the term "private ordering"1 - a failure that some
times leads to confusion. Some scholars identify private ordering with
non-state ordering. According to this view, the private legal systems
Robert Ellickson, Lisa Bernstein, McMillan & Woodruff, Mark West,
and others have investigated are "private" simply because their norms
are not manuf actured or enforced by the state. The alternative view
emphasizes the decentralized feature of private ordering systems.
Robert Ellickson, for example, studied "how people manage to inter
act to mutual advantage without the help of a state or other hierarchi
cal coordinator,"2 implying that any form of centralized coordination,
even. if not controlled by the state, renders the system less private.
Similarly, Bob Cooter has attributed the superiority of private order
ing to its decentralized structure and the fact that its lawmaking proc
esses are subject to competition.3 The second approach would treat a
nonstate legal system like that of the National Grain and Feed Asso
ciation (NGFA)4 as "private" only if (a) it competes with other asso
ciations, or (b) its substantive law gives priority to the law that mer* Tel Aviv University, School of Law. - Ed. I thank Mark West for the opportunity to
co=ent on his article and for his remarks on my co=ents. I am especially thankful to
him for providing me an access to the database he had put together so diligently. The tables
that I present in these co=ents are all based on the price information found in West's da
tabase.

1. Professor Fuller has defined private ordering as "law" that parties bring into exis
tence by agreement. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 79 YALE LJ.950, 950 n.1 (1979).
2.

ROBERT c. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW

1 (1991) (emphasis added).

3.

See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996).

4. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA.L. REV. 1765 {1996).
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chants write in their contracts. The mere fact that the organization is a
nonstate entity is not a sufficient condition for it to be "private." The
opposite may also hold - a piece of legislation produced by the state
may give rise to private ordering. The Clean Air Act, for example, is
certainly the product of a centralized lawmaking process, but it gener
ates a private ordering system: instead of dictating pollution stan
dards, it assigns property rights, thereby allowing the market to dictate
standards.5 Similarly, United States corporate law is produced and en
forced by states, but it may still be considered "private ordering" be
cause (a) states compete, and (b) states largely give priority to corpo
rate bylaws.
Mark West's fascinating article provides an interesting case study
for demonstrating the tension between these two approaches. In Pri
vate Ordering at the World's First Futures Exchange,6 West tells a re
markable story about the Dojima Rice Futures Exchange. The gov
ernance rules of this futures market, which began its operation in the
late seventeenth century and survived until World War II, resemble
those of any modem futures exchange, including clearing houses, bro
kers, margin accounts, and trading rules designed to contend with ma
nipulative practices.
Dojima's most striking feature, though, was its ability to function
smoothly despite the government's refusal to enforce futures con
tracts. But for a twelve-year hiatus (1773-1784), the futures market
was forced out of the Japanese legal system. West surmises that the
government vigilantly designed this force-out policy to facilitate Do
jima's efficient private ordering system. On the basis of pricing data
from 1755 to 1827, West concludes both that Dojima's private order
ing system was efficient and that the twelve-year experience of public
enforcement did not improve the market's performance. He then ar
gues that the data provide support for contemporary theories of pri
vate ordering, in particular the conjecture that private ordering of
over-the-counter derivative markets can be superior "when parties
'are involuntarily shut out' of the legal system."7
Notwithstanding my admiration for West's contribution to our un
derstanding of the historical evolution of futures markets, I am skepti
cal regarding his empirical and theoretical claims. Whereas West
claims that the government instituted its forcing-out policy to facilitate
the development of Dojima's private ordering and to promote market
efficiency, I question both the efficiency of the system and its private
nature.

5. See Cooter, supra note 3, at 1645.
6. Mark West, Private Ordering at the World's First Futures Exchange, 98 MICH. L. REV.
2574 {2000).
7.

Id.

(internal citation omitted).
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In the first part of these comments, I show that West's findings do
not support his claim that Dojima's governance rules were efficient.
At most, he demonstrates only a very weak form of information effi
ciency. In the second part, I offer an alternative, public-choice expla
nation for the evolution and persistence of the Dojima legal system. I
argue that the force-out policy was more likely implemented to pre
serve the monopoly power of a small group of traders and that of the
government itself. A careful analysis of West's database, presented in
the third part, provides support for this rent-seeking explanation and
undermines West's efficiency rationale. In particular, I show that the
Dojima market performed better during the twelve years of public en
forcement. All this, along with the fact that trading in the market was
contingent upon government licensing, suggests that the Dojima mar
ket was controlled by a centralized lawmaker with monopoly powers
subsidized by the government's force-out policy. Thus, although for
mally, Dojima was not a state entity, it does not comply with any of
the material conditions for entering the "private ordering" club.

PART A: MARKET EFFICIENCY
Mark West tests the efficiency of the Dojima exchange by meas
uring correlation between rice futures and spot prices. As shown in
Table 1 below, the correlation figures are indeed high. More impor
tantly, West's data suggest that correlation during the public enforce
ment era (1773-1784) was slightly higher than the correlation exhibited
after the 1773 edict was lifted, but slightly lower than before the edict
was introduced.8 On that basis, West concludes that legal intervention
did not improve the efficiency of the Dojima market.9

8. As shown in the table below, by excluding the years of the famine (1783-1787), which
are peculiar and not representative, we see a slightly different picture. Still, the correlation
during the edict is almost identical to the correlation figures before the 1773 decree was in
troduced.
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See West, supra note

6, at 2613.
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TABLE 1: CORRELATION BETWEEN FUTuRES AND SPOT PRICES

1
0.95
0.9
0.85
0.8

1

1755-1772

I

'�"I�

0.86
.

1773-1784

-

I

1785-1827

But what notion of efficiency does correlation test exactly?
Finance theorists define three levels of market efficiency: weak,
semi-strong, and strong. The efficiency levels differ in the type and
amount of information reflected in the market price. In the weak form
of market efficiency, prices reflect all information contained in the re
cord of past prices. In the semi-strong, prices reflect all publicly avail
able information. Lastly, markets are said to exhibit a strong form of
efficiency if prices incorporate "all the information that can be ac
quired by painstaking analysis of the company and the economy.'>10
Based on the correlation figures shown in Table 1 above, the most
favorable statement we can make about the Dojima market's effi
ciency is that futures prices reflected information about spot prices
and spot prices reflected information about futures prices - a rela
tively narrow information set, probably narrower than the set required
by the weak form of market efficiency. It certainly does not provide
support for West's efficiency claim. In fact, any other finding would
have been surprising. Consider, for example, West's description of the
evolution of the Dojima market. It supposedly all began with a for
ward contract signed between Chozaemon and a fellow Nagoyan
named Ichizaemon. The price of the contract they signed, as the the
ory of futures pricing predicts, was based upon the spot price and the
prevailing interest rate.11 If these two gentlemen were to enter a for
ward transaction the following day, they would do just the same, and
the correlation between the forward contract and spot prices would
again be very significant. Correlation between futures and spot prices,

10. RICHARD A. BREALY &
329 (5th ed. 1996).

STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE

FINANCE

11. See, e.g., HANS R. STOLL & ROBERT
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (1993).

E. WHALEY, FuTURES AND

OPTIONS -
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therefore, should be found even without an efficient, liquid futures
market in the background. The fact that futures prices in Dojima re
flected information about spot prices, and vice versa, is, therefore, al
most trivial.
Moreover, absent information about interest rates and storage
costs, it is impossible, merely on the basis of correlation figures, to
draw any conclusions regarding whether the futures market absorbed
information about the spot price, and vice versa, in an efficient man
ner. Consider an extreme case in which futures and spot prices per
fectly correlate (correlation=!). According to West, such a market is
more efficient than a market exhibiting lower correlation. But in fact,
assuming nonzero carrying costs, such a perfect correlation suggests
the market does not take carrying costs into account.
We may conclude, therefore, that strong correlation between fu
tures and spot prices tells us very little about the weak-form efficiency
of the futures market. It tells us nothing about the information re
flected in the spot and the futures prices. For example, we do not
know anything about the time it takes for the two markets {the spot
and the futures) to respond to information about an anticipated short
age in rice. In fact, in anticipation of such shortage the two markets
may respond inefficiently with a price decline, and yet, West's correla
tion test will consider this response efficient. Correlation tells us they
will respond together; it does not tell us anything about the timeliness
and the accuracy of that response.12
Our main interest, however, is not the information efficiency of the
Dojima futures market but rather the efficiency of its governance rules
and enforcement mechanisms. West seems to conflate information
and government efficiency, arguing that strong correlation implies the
efficiency of Dojima's private ordering system. But in fact, even if
West could prove that futures prices responded efficiently to spot
prices and carrying costs, such proof would hardly support the claim
that Dojima's governance rules were efficient. Futures prices must re
spond to spot price fluctuations, and vice versa; otherwise traders will
gain by arbitrage. This should hold true whether the enforcement
mechanism of futures contracts is efficient or not. In other words, a
very efficient market information-wise may operate under very ineffi
cient enforcement mechanisms. If enforcement is inefficient, transac
tion costs should increase, and we should expect fewer transactions to
be executed; but, those futures transactions that do take place must be
priced in relation to spot prices.

12. Following my oral co=ent, West concedes in the final version of his article that
"insufficient data exist to determine the market's informational efficiency. " West, supra
note 6, at 2599. But he still claims that his correlation tests "provide insight into whether
Dojima functioned in accordance with modem efficient market theory." Id.
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To test the efficiency of Dojima's private ordering system and to
measure the effect of public enforcement, we should look at other
data, such as trade volume and margin rules. If indeed, as West
claims, public enforcement was inefficient, enforcement costs should
have increased during the legal intervention era, causing an increase in
margin requirements and a decrease in trade volume. Apparently,
however, no reliable data on these factors are available.

PART B: A RENT-SEEKING EXPLANATION FOR PRIVATE ORDERING
We tend to think of private ordering systems as a profound exam
ple of free markets, subject to no government intervention. No
wonder West considers the Japanese policy toward Dojima as nonin
terventionist. But whether a policy is interventionist or noninterven
tionist depends largely upon our understanding of the role of the state.
A libertarian would define an antimonopoly policy as interventionist.
A traditional law and economics scholar, on the other hand, would
view the enforcement of a cartel agreement as government interven
tion. In other words, characterizing a policy as interventionist is
meaningless because it proves too much. Any policy, including the
crudest free market policy, is inevitably interventionist.13 Hence, the
question is not whether the government adopts an interventionist or a
noninterventionist policy, but rather whether its manner of interven
tion is justifiable.14
Clearly, West uses the term "intervention" in the popular sense, as
an antonym for a laissez-faire policy - a policy that respects parties'
freedom of contract. He cites scholars who argue that "legal interven
tion can improve the welfare of market participants only when partici
pants have poor judgment or face high drafting costs. Absent either of
these circumstances, legal intervention hurts participants."15 But this
school of thought, which West claims to join, endorses the very policy
to which West objects, namely, the public enforcement of contracts.
Indeed, the scholars on whom West relies label a court decision not to
enforce a contract as interventionist.16 This traditional law and eco-

13. See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,
38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923).
14. See Richard A. Epstein, The Assault that Failed: The Progressive Critique of Laissez
Faire, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1697 (1999) (reviewing BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE
ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS
MOVEMENT (1998)).
15. West, supra note 6, at 2575.
16. See, for example, Ian Ayres's statement in Symposium - Just Winners and Losers:
The Application of Game Theory to Corporate Law and Practice: Panel Discussion, 60 U.
CIN. L. REV. 405, 409-10 (1991) ("These inefficiencies might call for . . . government interventions . . . where the law says, 'you can contract for higher duties . . . but there 's an inlmutable floor of good faith that you can't get around. ' ).
"
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nomics approach typically views the enforcement of contracts as the
main role of the state. Hence, according to this school of thought, the
law should certainly allow parties to opt out of the legal system; but a
force-out policy is as interventionist as any other form of regulation
that forces market participants into the public ordering system.
In fact, if we measure intervention on a competition-monopoly
scale, a force-out policy may be even more interventionist and anti
competition than a force-in legislation. A force-out policy denies ill
reputed players the option of assuming liability, thereby leveling their
trustworthiness with that of the reputed firms. Hence, it raises entry
barriers, restricts competition, and preserves the reputed firms' mar
ket power. A force-in policy, on the other hand, subsidizes the ill
reputed firms by providing them the backing of legal liability. At the
same time it taxes reputed firms - from their perspective, given their
reputation, the marginal cost of liability exceeds the marginal benefit.
Consequently, reputed firms will be forced to raise prices, entry barri
ers will diminish, and ill-reputed firms will find it easier to compete.
My underlying claim, therefore, is that a force-out policy is very
similar to any other immutable term the law imposes on contractual
parties, and sometimes it is even more anticompetitive than a force-in
legislation. Like any other form of regulation, therefore, the Japanese
government's force-out policy may simply be the product of rent
seeking in the service of a narrow group of reputed brokers and
clearing houses. This policy forced rice growers and ill-reputed trad
ers to use the intermediary services of the large reputed firms.
The rent-seeking story provides an alternative view of Dojima,
which, I believe, is more persuasive than West's claim that the gov
ernment was motivated by an urge to facilitate an efficient private or
dering system. The fact that the nonenforcement policy coexisted with
a license requirement provides further support for the rent-seeking ar
gument and weakens West's characterization of the Japanese policy as
noninterventionist, laissez-faire legislation.
Now, the skeptical reader may argue that if the forcing-out policy
was indeed inefficient, other interest groups would have lobbied for a
change. In West's words, the longevity of this market is, arguably, the
best evidence of its efficiency. Indeed, how can the rent-seeking story
explain Dojima's longevity? One explanation is that the group of
clearing houses and brokers, who enjoyed the benefits of nonenforce
ment, was narrow and well organized to lobby for it. The harms, on
the other hand, were widely dispersed such that the relevant interest
group, rice growers for example, could hardly organize to lobby for
enforcement. Another possibility is that the force-out policy served
another interest group - the government itself. The more competi
tive the market, the more dispersed the revenues, and therefore, the
harder it is for the government to collect taxes. By refusing to enforce
rice futures transactions, the government increased the appeal of the
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Osaka reputed market and magnified the rents traders derived from
the license to trade in Dojima. This, in turn, enabled the government
to charge higher fees for the licenses it issued.
Having said all this, I must concede the fact that the force-out pol
icy served a narrow interest group does not negate the possibility that
the policy was nonetheless efficient. Theoretically, we may justify
high entry barriers to futures trading on the grounds that it reduces
the free ride that traders can take on the transparency of the futures
exchange. The refusal of the government to enforce futures contracts
increases the cost of entering forward transactions outside Dojima,
and promotes the attractiveness of the Dojima reputed market. Thus,
it protects the exchange's property rights in the price information the
exchange produces. We may conclude, therefore, that the rent
seeking story may explain how an inefficient regulatory system can
survive for a long time but it does not negate the possibility that the
regulation of the futures market in Japan was efficient. We need more
empirical evidence to examine whether the force-out policy was in
deed efficient.
PART C: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE
RENT-SEEKING ARGUMENT

A deep look into West's database provides a few results that sup
port the rent-seeking explanation. Absent data on broker commis
sion, margin requirements, and trade volume, volatility is probably the
best proxy we can use to measure the efficiency of the government's
"intervention." If, indeed, public enforcement reduces transaction
costs, then more traders will participate in the game, volume of trade
should increase, the price signal should incorporate more information
and opinions, and therefore, the market should be less volatile.
Table 2 presents market volatility, measured as the standard devia
tion of returns, during three periods: the pre-intervention era (17551772); the intervention era (1773-1784); and the post-intervention era
(1785-1827). Table 3 provides a very similar picture but excludes the
famine period, from 1783 to 1787. As West explains, the famine is a
very peculiar, unrepresentative era, and therefore, it is probably justi
fiable to exclude it from the study.

[Vol. 98:2620
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TABLE 2: FuTuRES VOLATILITY
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TABLE 3: FuTuRES VOLATILITY (FAMINE EXCLUDED)
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As shown in the tables above, volatility declined substantially
during the intervention era.17 Compare these findings with those of
Carol Simon's study of the 1933 Securities Act's effect on the stock
market.18 Simon found that after 1933, standard deviation of returns
on investment in new issues declined significantly. Despite the fact
that such a decline could have been linked to other coincidental
events, many consider Simon's study as strong evidence for the claim
that the Securities Act improved market efficiency.19 The data on the
Osaka market is even more persuasive because it is based on two an
ecdotes: as shown in Table 2 and more so in Table 3, volatility sharply
declined after the 1773 edict ensured public enforcement of futures
contracts and rose again, back to the pre-edict levels, when the 1773
edict was lifted. Although there is also a possibility that this is mere
coincidence, the evidence does at least suggest that the change in vola
tility might have been the consequence of the shift in enforcement
policy.
In an earlier version of his article, West dismissed the evidence on
volatility as irrelevant for the following reason:20 a similar decline in
volatility is evidenced in the spot market (see Table 4 below). West
argued that the decline in spot volatility cannot be explained by the
legal intervention, because unlike futures, rice transactions were al
ways enforced - before, during, and after the intervention. Since the
decline in the spot volatility cannot be explained by the intervention,
other factors must have affected volatility in the spot market, and
these factors must have affected the volatility of the futures market as
well.

17. All the results presented in these co=ents that point to differences between mar
ket performance during the intervention and nonintervention eras are statistically signifi
cant, at least at the 5% level.
18. See Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the I933 Securities Act on Investor Information and
the Performance of New Issues, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 295 (1989).
19. See, for example, Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why
Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1371 n.83 (1999), who
argues that "everyone . . . accepts the theoretical proposition that any information that is of
value to investors for predicting the future with greater accuracy will lead to less share price
dispersion " and that "[Simon's] results showing that the post-Act group in fact had less dis
persion should therefore logically lead one to the conclusion that the information that the
Securities Act prompted to be disclosed was in fact of such value, unless one had affirmative
evidence suggesting that some other factor was responsible. "
20. Following my oral co=ent, West has removed this dismissal from his article.

TABLE 4:
9
8.5
8
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SPOT AND FuTURES VOLATILITY

1

8.5

-
'

7

;

6.5

>'.

?

'

6
5.5
5

8.7 ··--;

6.1

6.2 -

=i

-----

==1
-1
!

4.5
4

1755-1772

1773-1782

Spot C Futures

1788-1827

I

I beg to differ. Although we cannot reject the possibility of other,
coincidental factors that affected volatility during the public enforce
ment era, the mere fact that volatility in rice spot price also declined
does not mean that the volatility decline was not caused by the inter
vention. West's argument wrongly assumes that spot prices affect fu
tures prices but futures prices cannot affect spot prices. As explained
earlier, spot and futures prices must move together, otherwise there is
room for arbitrage. Therefore, the decline in futures volatility, argua
bly caused by the intervention, must have reduced volatility in the spot
market.
We can look at the same argument from the rice-growers' perspec
tive: if futures contracts are more efficiently enforced, transaction
costs should decrease, and rice growers should be able to hedge their
positions more easily and cheaply. If hedging is cheaper and more ac
cessible, more people will enter the business of growing rice, and risk
averse farmers will grow more rice. This should lead to two results:
First, the higher the trade volume in one or both of these markets (fu
tures and/or spot), the more stable the two markets should be. We
have witnessed just such an effect in Table 4. Table 5 below provides
a more detailed look, in which I have divided the seventy-three years
of data into eight periods: the famine, the decade of the intervention,
and six other comparable decades (the famine excluded). A glance at
Table 5 shows clearly that volatility during the intervention was sig
nificantly lower than that experienced during any other comparable
decade.
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TABLES: F'UTIJRES AND SPOT VOLATILITY
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But we should anticipate another effect as well: if indeed transac
tion costs were lower during the public enforcement era, hedging
should have been cheaper, and risk-averse farmers could hedge and
grow more rice. Consequently, the supply of rice must have increased
and we should expect to find a decline in rice prices. Indeed, as shown
in Tables 6-9 below, rice prices declined significantly during the public
enforcement era.
In Table 6, I compare price levels before, during, and after the in
tervention. The average price during the intervention was about 5%
lower than the average price during the pre- and the post-intervention
eras.
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TABLE 6: SPOT AND FuTURES PRICES

As shown in Table 7 below, with the exclusion of the famine pe
riod, intervention-era prices are even lower - about 12% below the
pre- and the post-intervention (the famine excluded of course) peri
ods.
TABLE 7: FuTURES AND SPOT PRICES (FAMINE EXCLUDED)
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Table 8 presents a more complete picture of price levels during the
eight periods examined.
TABLE 8: FlITURES AND SPOT PRICES
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Lastly, Table 9 below presents the 95% confidence intervals for
average futures prices at each period.21

21. The picture of the confidence interval for average spot prices looks very similar.
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TABLE 9: 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL FOR AVERAGE
FlITURES PRICES
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We may conclude, therefore, that during the intervention era,
when courts were willing to enforce futures contracts, both price vola
tility and price levels were significantly lower than in any other com
parable decade. Clearly, this evidence does not prove, beyond a rea
sonable doubt, a causal relationship between public enforcement and
improved market conditions. Arguably, other factors with which I am
not familiar may account for this change.22 Yet, one convincing data

22. In response to my oral comment, West concedes in the final version of his article
that price levels are relevant and should be examined. He argues, however, that there is
probably no causal connection between the intervention and the price decline. See West,
supra note 6, at 2611. He bases this argument on the fact that the Kyoto Price Index, as re
ported by Crawcour and Yamamura, was significantly lower during the intervention era than
the index after the intervention. Indeed, the average index during the years 1773-1782 (i.e.,
the intervention era excluding the famine) was about 14% lower than the average index
from 1788 to 1797. The same factors that account for the index decline, West argues, must
also explain the decline in rice price. See id. This response is problematic. The Kyoto Index
is comprised of five equally-weighted products including rice. Correlation figures between
average rice prices and index levels are close to 0.9. Moreover, there are several missing
data-points in Crawcour & Yamamura's database-most importantly, for the years at stake
{1773-1783), the database reports prices for only four products-no data on soy paste prices
are available for this period. Thus, the weight of rice in the index is 25%.
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point suggests the volatility and price declines were not mere coinci
dence - the 1730 statute that authorized the operation of the Dojima
market and excluded futures contracts from the public order explicitly
declared that "[t]he purpose of this authorization is to raise rice
prices."23 Thus, I believe the overall evidence casts doubts on West's
claim that the government implemented the force-out policy to facili
tate an efficient private ordering system. Rather, my analysis of
West's database highlights the inefficiency of the force-out policy and
shows that the 1773 edict, which introduced public enforcement,
served the broad interests of Japan's society.
SUMMARY
These comments offer a competing, alternative story for the ori
gins of Dojima's private ordering system. Whereas West claims that
the government adopted its noninterventionist approach for the pur
pose of facilitating an efficient private ordering system,24 the story I
tell is more skeptical. I argue that the force-out policy might have
been the product of rent-seeking activity, the purpose of which was to
raise rice prices, to increase entry barriers to the futures market, and
to benefit the large, reputed clearing-houses and government officials.
I believe the evidence that West's article provides supports my
claim. First, the fact that the nonenforcement policy operated along
side a licensing requirement provides support for the rent-seeking ar
gument and weakens West's characterization of the Japanese policy as
a noninterventionist, laissez-faire policy. Second, if there is any "ob
jective" definition for intervention, it should incorporate monopoliza
tion of the market. A policy that raises entry barriers by licensing or
by refusing to enforce contracts and declares its goal to be a rise in rice
prices is definitely an interventionist policy. Lastly, I have shown that
the pricing data West collected suggest that market performance un
der public ordering was superior: volatility and price levels were sub
stantially and significantly lower when courts enforced futures con
tracts.

Excluding the rice and the soy paste from the index, I have found that the average index
(of the three products) from 1773 to 1782 was about 6% lower than the average index level
from 1778 to 1797. This finding seems to provide some support for West 's claim; but, when
we look at the rice price index (Crawcour and Yamamura report) during the same periods,
we find that during the intervention era (1773-1782) the average rice price was about 25%
lower than the average rice price during the post-intervention era (1778-1797).
23. See West, supra note 6,

at 2584.

24. See id. at 2591 (arguing that "the Japanese government ... apparently sought to
promote ... private ordering ").

